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ket rates. As Chart 1 shows, the average gap
between the prime rate and the commercial
paper rate has been larger since the early 1980s.
Goldberg (1982) offers some reasons banks
would have for using average cost pricing. For
example, on floating-rate loans, average cost
This lagged adjustment has been used to argue
that banks set the prime based on their average
cost rather than their marginal cost of funds. That
is, banks set the prime based on the average rate
they pay on outstanding liabilities, and not on











Why is the prime rate sticky?
Because the prime rate is mainly a reference
rate for short-term loans, the prime rate should
move with short-term market interest rates,
which essentially represent a bank's marginal
cost of funds to finance such loans. Chart 1 sug-
gests that this generally has been the case. In fact,
Laderman (1990) finds that the bank prime rate
has become more responsive to open market
interest rates since the early 1980s. However, the
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Some observers have argued that this represents
an unusually slow adjustment of the prime, and
they cite two factors to explain it-first, the tight-
ening of credit standards among banks over the
past year and a half and second, the need for
banks to cover losses associated with nonper-
forming assets.
What is the prime?
The bank prime rate is most commonly used as
a reference rate on floating-rate loans, where the
floating rate is set at some premium or discount
relative to the prime. In the past, the prime rate
represented the interest rate charged to the most
creditworthy customers. But today the prime rate
is more commonly used for pricing smaller busi-
ness loans as well as some consumer loans.
Large creditworthy borrowers' loans are indexed
instead to interest rates representing the marginal
cost of bank funds, like CD rates, L1BOR (Lon-
don Interbank Overnight Rate), and the federal
funds rate, a practice that became well-estab-
lished in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
As open market interest rates have dropped over
the past several months, the bank prime rate has
not kept pace. For example, although the 90-day
commercial paper rate fell by more than 200
basis points between October 1990 and May
1991, the prime rate moved down by only 150
basis points in the same period.
This Letter examines the relationship between
the bank prime rate and short-term open market
interest rates to determine whether the prime has
been unusually sticky in recent months. The evi-
dence indicates that through the early part of this
year the bank prime rate adjusted about as fast as
it had in the past. However, based on its past re-
lationship with open market interestrates, the
prime rate should decline even further in coming
months.
The shift in the role of the prime rate is reflected
in the spread between the prime and open mar-FRBSF
pricing would reduce interest rate risk for a bank
if the maturity of its liabilities exceeds the repric-
ing interval of the loan. Goldberg also argues
that average cost pricing could serve as an anti-
competitive mechanism for enhancing oligopoly
discipline among banks and for coordinating
price changes without the appearance of
collusion.
But lagged adjustment in the bank prime rate
also could be consistent with marginal cost
pricing. The lag could be partly due to admin-
istrative delays. It takes time for bank decision-
makers to evaluate market conditions and to
react to them. The operational cost to a bank of
changing the reference rate on loans also would
lead to delays in adjusting to changes in the
marginal cost of funds. If adjustments are costly,
banks are less likely to move the prime rate
when they think a change in market interest rates
will be reversed soon. In addition, banks are less
likely to change the prime rate when the devia-
tion from the normal spread between the prime
rate and the marginal cost of funds is small rela-
tive to the operating costs associated with alter-
ing the reference rate. Adjustment costs also
would help to explain why banks change the
prime rate in discrete (25 basis points)
increments.
Asymmetry in the lag
Whether banks use marginal cost pricing or
average cost pricing, the prime rate should track
market rates with a lag, which should be more
or less the same for periods of increasing or
decreasing interest rates. However, it often is
argued that the bank prime rate adjusts more
slowly when interest rates are falling, because
banks try to add to their interest margins by
holding up loan rates as the rates on their
liabilities fall.
Why wouldn't customers leave such banks and
flock to competitors offering lower rates? For one
thing, it may be more costly-in terms of time,
money, and effort-to set up a relationship with
a new bank than it is to pay a higher interest rate
at the old bank. In that case, when interest rates
are falling, a bank could keep its loan rates up
without losing too many of its customers to
competitors. On the other hand, when market
interest rates are rising, a bank has little incentive
to lag the interest rates on its loans and would
adjust them quickly, thus producing an asymme-
try in the rate ofthe lag response of the bank
prime rate.
Estimating the response
To find out whether the prime has been adjusting
more slowly than normal, we have to be able to
say what is normal. To do that, a number of sta-
tistical models for determining the prime rate
were estimated. The basic feature of the models
is that the prime rate adjusts to open market in-
terest rates with a lag. Each model includes the
prime rate as a function of a contemporaneous
short-term, open market interest rate and the
lagged prime rate. Most ofthe analysis for this
Letter uses monthly data from 1982 to the
present.
The statistical results do not show evidence
that the prime rate responded more slowly when
interest rates were falling over the period since
1982. This contrasts with previous studies cover-
ing periods up to the early 1980s that find evi-
dence of asymmetry in the adjustment of the
prime rate. That asymmetry is apparent in the top
panel of Chart 1 for the 1970s and early 1980s.
However, analysis done for this Letter shows that,
even forthe period before the 1980s, the degree
of asymmetry in the adjustment of the prime rate
was relatively small. These results suggest that
banks' attempts to add to interest margins were
not the major factors determining the response
of the prime rate during periods of declining
open market interest rates.
Recent movements in the prime
The statistical results can be used to evaluate
whether the recent adjustments in the prime rate
have been unusually sluggish by comparing ac-
tual values of the bank prime rate to predicted
values. (See Chart 2.) The predicted prime rate is
based on the historical relationship of the prime
rate to the 90-day commercial paper rate. The
analysis using other short-term market rates
provides similar results.
Through the early part of this year, the adjust-
ment in the bank prime rate closely followed the
predicted prime rate. That is, the lag in the re-
sponse of the prime rate to the decline in open
market interest rates was not much different from
the average in the past. This says that any tight-
ening of credit standards by banks over the past
several quarters was not reflected in a significant
and consistent way in an unusually high bankLooking ahead
If the underlying relationship between the bank
prime rate and short-term open market rates has
changed, the shift should be apparent later this
year. This is illustrated in Chart 2, which shows
that a prime rate of 8Yz percent would be about
60 basis points higher than the predicted value
ih the latter part of this year, assuming short-term
market rates remain at their earlyJune levels·
through December. A spread of that magnitude
would not be expected to persist.
Whether the prime will drop further remains
to be seen. Given the uncertainty over the econ-
omy, some hesitation in lowering the prime rate
would be understandable. Moreover, the height-
ened risk associated with the recession might
lead to a somewhat higher than usual prime rate
for some period of time. Such considerations
could temporarily dampen the tendency banks
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prime rate. Moreover, the results through Febru-
ary do not support the view that banks consis-
tently keep the prime rate unusually high as
part of a strategy to cover losses.
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It is worth noting however, that a gap between
the predicted and actual values opened up in
March and April of this year. In April, the prime
rate was about 70 basis points higher than pre-
dicted, given the preceding decline in open
market rates, and the difference is statistically
significant. With the drop in the bank prime rate
in early May, the spread between the predicted
and actual rate for the month narrowed to about
40 basis points. While that spread is relatively
wide, it is still too soon to conclude that there
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